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3.1 Introduction 
It has become fashionable in both the scholarly and corporate worlds to lay claim to being the 
first to have predicted the global financial crisis (GFC) of 2008. As the cliché goes, hindsight 
is a wonderful thing, and given this analysis it would seem axiomatic that commentators 
would identify the poor governance of international and domestic financial institutions as a 
leverage point for reform. And indeed they did – in 1999. In commenting on the lessons to be 
learned from the Asian financial crisis Jeffrey Garten, Dean of the Yale School of 
Management at the time, delineated a scenario virtually identical to the GFC, in which lenders 
and investors in an inherently unstable and overstretched financial system failed to read the 
signs, deluded themselves about the nature of the markets they were involved in, and fled at 
the first indication that the good times were over (Garten 1999). This led him to conclude that 
better governance of financial institutions and corporations was a solution that would help 
mitigate the next crisis. Yet ten years later, analysts are still calling for global governance 
reform, and have extended their criticisms to include intergovernmental processes, which they 
consider to have lost their legitimacy (Bradford and Linn 2009).  
Can any governance-related lessons be learned from the GFC and are there any parallels to 
be drawn with the rapidly expanding global ‘responsible’ investment (RI) market? In the case 
of the former, a huge range of complex and competitive products led investors to rely on 
entrepreneurs to attest to the legitimacy of the schemes in question, such as brokers, analysts 
and credit rating agencies (CRAs). In the case of RI, there are also varied and competing 
products in the market place, about which it is claimed, the consumer can rest assured, since 
there are ‘disclosure’ mechanisms, backed up by implementation consultants, and rating 
agencies. But it is incorrect to assume that the current practice of RI covers all its bases, as its 
focus is on a very limited set of indicators, which are unable to demonstrate ethical corporate 
governance across the board. Even if it is accepted that RI addresses a limited set of corporate 
governance issues, there are problems in this regard too, since there is no consistent, universal 
  2 
agreement over what aspects of performance a company should be disclosing, or what exactly 
constitutes accountability, and so forth.  
Following recent developments in contemporary governance theory and practice, this 
chapter argues from a social constructivist viewpoint that responsible investment needs to be 
understood in inter-subjective terms, whereby the institutions within which social identities 
and interests operate are interactively constituted by means of collective intentionality 
(Barnett 2007, Ruggie 1998). Translated into more plain English terms, RI reflects the trends 
found across the field of sustainable development whereby non-government organizations 
(NGOs), stakeholders and other market-based actors are interacting within systems that have 
a wider focus than traditional ‘top-down’ institutions, and in which all actors play a role in 
institutional development. In the case of RI, maximising shareholder returns is supplemented 
by broader concerns about environmental-social governance (ESG) in financial practice 
(Hawley and Williams 2005). Once it is accepted that the RI community is made up of a wide 
range of participants, from shareholders and other ‘internal’ interests to ‘external’ groups in 
civil society, and that these actors both shape and share ideas about investment, it becomes 
necessary to re-cast the governance frameworks through which claims about the legitimacy of 
RI are evaluated. On this view, the concept of ‘universal ownership’ is extended beyond large 
institutional investors to include interests traditionally seen as peripheral to business practice. 
By understanding RI as being founded on stakeholder engagement in the broadest possible 
sense, fiduciary duty can be measured in terms of the levels of interaction and collaboration in 
the development of environmental, social or economic outcomes. This allows for a less 
functionalist and less utilitarian – and in that sense a more ethical - model of governance 
quality. 
This chapter investigates the changing identity of contemporary global governance, most 
notably through the contribution of sustainable development and looks at how this has come 
to be reflected in the financial, and RI sector in particular. Given the ever-expanding range of 
RI products and the confusion and lack of consistency across the sector, it justifies the use of 
a governance quality framework to evaluate institutional performance and legitimacy. It 
argues that focussing on single aspects of governance, notably accountability and 
transparency, is an incomplete project, and presents an agenda for reform built upon a set of 
principles, criteria and indicators (PC&I) for evaluating institutional behaviour as a whole.  
 
3.2 Contemporary Governance 
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Governance, understood as a mechanism for steering or coordinating policy making and 
implementation, has moved away from top-down, command/control administrative models 
and is now typified by the social-political, and collaborative, nature of the interactions 
occurring within them (Kooiman 1993, 2000). As a result, there has been an ongoing 
evolution towards the more abstract concepts of governance, based on the ‘dynamic interplay 
between civil society, business and public sector’ (Ruggie 2003). These new systems now sit 
alongside traditional, more legalistic, mechanisms (Fiorino 1999) and are exemplified by a 
range of new policy instruments, including voluntary agreements, management systems and 
market-based instruments such as emissions trading (Jordan et al. 2005). This development 
has been interpreted as being closely related to economic globalisation (Falkner 2003). 
The environmental policy domain provides one of the best spaces available to study the 
emergence of new modes of governance that have arisen in response to globalisation (Arts 
2006). This is because it is in the environment sector that some of the most extensive and 
innovative experiments in ‘new’ governance are to be found (Glück et al. 2005). What is 
occurring in this domain contains theoretically interesting reactions to some of the larger 
political and economic trends associated with globalisation and governance. It consequently 
provides one of the most useful lenses through which to scrutinise ‘the increasing tendency 
for collaboration in many sectors where political and economic trade-offs also exist’ 
(Overdevest 2004) and provides one of the best study areas for the involvement of civil 
society, private industry, and the state in the development of regulatory regimes (Mackendrick 
2005). 
Global governance provides for international collaboration and co-ordination in a system, 
which feeds into the macro (national), meso (programmatic) and micro (organisational) levels 
(Aguirre 2008, Bouckaert and Halligan 2008). Contemporary governance consequently shows 
a preference for interaction between decentralised networks made up of multiple actors 
functioning at multi-levels; environmental governance articulates this trend especially 
strongly (Haas 2001, Glück et al. 2005). Although ‘governance without government’ 
(Rosenau and Czempiel 1992) may still be some way off the ‘government to governance 
transition’ is well underway (Scholte 2008). Corporate and civic – primarily NGO driven – 
initiatives have especially contributed to the growth of a form of global governance consisting 
of ‘mechanisms to reach collective decisions about transnational problems with or without 
government participation’ (Haufler 2001).  
The participation of non-state interests, economic, environmental and social, in global 
governance can be largely attributed to the United Nations Conference on Environment and 
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development (UNCED), where business and NGOs in particular were active in shaping the 
agenda and outcomes (Birnie 2000). Agenda 21, the primary output of UNCED identified 
non-governmental interests as vital to participatory democracy, whilst simultaneously 
encouraging business to use the free market as a means for participation in sustainable 
development (UN 1993). Since UNCED, sustainable development has been implemented 
through a range of UN processes. These include the Commission for Sustainable 
Development (1992) and conventions on biodiversity (1992), climate change (1994), and 
desertification (1996). Since Rio, the UN has continued to promote sustainable development 
through a range of initiatives, including the Global Compact (2000). Other events of 
significance include the Millennium Summit (2001) and the World Conference on Sustainable 
Development (2002).  
The phenomenon of collaboration and co-ordination is also evident in developments within 
corporate governance. In 1999, the World Bank and the Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) co-founded the Global Corporate Governance Forum 
(GCGF) as a facility of the International Finance Corporation (IFC). The aim of the Forum is 
to encourage companies to invest, and behave, in a socially responsible manner (GCGF 
2010). Ten years on, the proliferation of ‘new’ governance into corporate governance practice 
is visible, and it is now possible to speak of ‘new corporate governance’, which reflects the 
norms of contemporary governance theory including an orientation around such socially-
oriented values as learning, consensus and trust (Hilb 2009). As companies become more 
global, they are increasingly reliant on non-state actors, who often have very different 
objectives from state agents. The capacity of these actors to work as change agents has 
necessitated their incorporation within some of the established institutions affecting the 
development of corporate governance. The World Bank through its Global Partnerships 
Programme, for example, now funds civil society interests (largely NGOs) to promote good 
governance by playing a watchdog role. The Bank estimates that this initiative has resulted in 
cost savings of USD $100 million by increasing transparency and avoiding corruption (World 
Bank 2006). Analysing the role of these interests is therefore essential in understanding the 
emergence of any future global corporate governance regime (Detomasi 2006). Governments 
have not been sidelined, however. In the light of the GFC, the state is again beginning to play 
a more interventionist role in global finance, but the observation nevertheless remains valid. 
 
3.3 Responsible investment and environmental and social governance 
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The concept of ‘ethical investment’ has been around for some years, but became increasingly 
popular in the 1990s (Knowles 1997). The norm-building role of the United Nations 
Environment Programme Finance Initiative (UNEP FI) cannot be understated. UNEP FI is a 
typical institutional exemplar of a (global) public-private partnership (PPP), following the 
network model of new governance practice (UNEP FI 2009a), and consists of representatives 
from both the private financial sector and United Nations Environment Programme staff, 
governed by a joint steering committee. In 2003 its two main initiatives, relating to financial 
institutions and the insurance industry were combined to reflect the already existing 
collaboration between the two projects (UNEP FI 2009b). The mission of the programme is to 
‘identify, promote, and realise the adoption of best environmental and sustainability practice 
at all levels of financial institution operations’ (UNEP FI undated). It currently consists of 
approximately 170 members, including fund managers, banks and insurers (UNEP FI 2009c). 
Institutions are expected to sign two UNEP statements confirming their commitment to the 
environment and sustainable development of the financial and insurance industries, and to 
agree to the recommendations submitted by UNEP to the World Summit for Sustainable 
Development (WSSD) in 2002. The statements represent ‘aspirational voluntary declarations 
of intent’ (UNEP FI 2009d), reflecting the norm of global environmental governance, 
established at UNCED, for voluntary self-regulated approaches to corporate accountability, 
responsibility and implementation (Clapp 2005). In 2005 it engaged in a process with the UN 
Global Compact and investment industry representatives to develop a set of principles for 
responsible investment (PRI) (Global Compact and UNEP FI 2009a). By 2007, 200 
investment organisations from 25 countries had committed to the PRI, managing assets 
approaching USD 10 trillion (UNEP FI and UN Global Compact 2007).  
The PRI initiative is aimed at integrating environmental and social governance (ESG) 
issues into the financial sub-sectors of asset owners, investment managers and professional 
service partners (Global Compact and UNEP FI 2009b). These cover elements required for 
reporting on environmental and social performance, referred to as sustainability reporting 
(UNEP FI 2009e). These reporting elements were identified and developed between 2003 and 
2005 in collaboration with the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI), and building on the 2002 
social performance indicators of SPI Finance. A working group was established, consisting of 
11 financial institutions including the National Australia Bank and Bank of China, and eight 
‘stakeholder groups’ including the Corporate Citizens Centre, Friends of the Earth and The 
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Wilderness Society of Australia, which ran between 2006 and 2008 to pilot and review a draft 
version (UNEP FI 2009f).1 The output, the GRI Financial Services Sector Supplement, it was 
envisaged, would ‘become the sustainability reporting standard for the financial sector’ 
(UNEP FI 2009g).  
This supplement situates the notion of sustainability reporting against a background of 
‘transparency about economic, environmental and social impacts [as] a fundamental 
component in effective stakeholder relations, investment decisions, and other market 
relations’ (GRI 2008). Economic reporting concerns financial performance, market presence, 
indirect economic impacts, and investment in the community. Environmental reporting 
concerns a number of elements, including materials, energy, water, biodiversity, emissions, 
compliance and transport. Social reporting covers four sub-themes: labour and work practices, 
human rights, society, and product responsibility. Each of these activities is reported against a 
series of performance indicators (GRI 2008). By 2008 almost 25% of the Standard and Poor 
(S&P) 500 companies, and approximately 1,500 in total were using the GRI framework for 
the purposes of GRI reporting (Waddock 2008).  
However, it is wrong to assume that RI, as normatively embedded within UNEP FI as it 
may appear, is a monolithic, or consistent, entity. It is governed by a plethora of initiatives 
that have arisen in the absence of any formal global corporate governance system. According 
to Waddock, there are a variety of institutions and assessment programmes, using a range of 
models to determine corporate social and environmental sustainability. These cover the gamut 
of institutional types, from state/government to market/economic and civil society. Certainly 
the UN-based models are significant, and omnipresent, including the PRI, but there are other 
significant initiatives, including a direct competitor, the Equator Principles, which functions 
as a system for benchmarking environmental and social issues in the determination, 
assessment and management of project financing. Such programmes then begin to blend into 
the less directly finance oriented, corporate social responsibility (CSR) schemes, such as the 
Private Voluntary Organization Standards, the Global Sullivan Principles, the OECD 
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and the International Non-Governmental 
Organizations Accountability Charter – to name but a few. There are also the International 
Standardisation Organisation’s (ISO) 26000 series for corporate responsibility, Social 
                                                
1 It should be noted here that not all participants were particularly enthusiastic about the legitimacy of this 
working group. Two representatives from one national (Australian) environmental NGO questioned its 
credibility, one of whom dismissed its consultation processes as ‘a classical example of tokenism’, which had 
sought their views on sustainability, whilst permitting its members to continue destroying the environment as 
part of their daily corporate activities (personal interview conducted 23/09/09). 
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Accountability International (SAI) SA8000 standards, and the AccountAbility AA 1000 series 
of standards. This vast array of schemes has resulted in a growing consulting industry to assist 
with implementation. These too vary in organisational type, and are located in both the 
business and non-profit sectors. There is also a further collection of think tanks, institutions, 
forums and other associations that seek to lobby, comment, and provide assistance on matters 
of sustainable development, including investment. There are also watchdogs and other activist 
organisations that are seeking to raise awareness regarding the activities of corporations, 
which do not have responsibility standards in place, and are simply engaging in 
‘greenwashing’. Beyond these again are the journals and magazines that cover the issues 
surrounding responsible investment and other initiatives; finally there are the ranking and 
rating agencies. The fact that there are now so many players and conflicting standards on the 
scene is resulting in confusion. There is clearly a need for some level of consolidation, but 
who will emerge as the dominant player, whether it be the GRI, the Global Compact, some 
other competitor, or any, is not yet clear (Waddock 2008).  
However, this rapidly expanding plethora of competing systems has created confusion 
amongst governments, citizens and corporations alike, over which programmes to adopt and 
their associated costs and benefits. Despite the proliferation of such systems, there are no 
consistent rules or standards to guide them (Whitman 2005). Given their inconsistencies and 
differences in approach, it is therefore not always possible to determine which schemes offer 
genuine economic, environmental or social benefits, or merely ‘greenwash’. This is 
problematic, since scholars have voiced wide-ranging criticisms regarding the legitimacy of 
contemporary global institutions (Dimitrov 2005). Whilst there are a number of organisations 
such as ISO and the International Social and Environmental Accreditation and Labelling 
Alliance (ISEAL), which accredit the activities of individual schemes, there are no best 
practice governance standards across the sustainable development policy domain, against 
which the performance of competing schemes can be evaluated. In the wake of the GFC, RI 
should pay greater attention to the governance of sustainable development, particularly given 
the sector’s increasing engagement in emissions trading and ‘offset’ programmes. 
Governance standards will help avoid some of the uncertainties that interested parties 
currently experience regarding the legitimacy of a given system, and whether to lend it 
unwarranted credibility through their participation.  
 
3.4 Emerging governance arrangements and responsible investment 
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The term ‘governance arrangement’ is used to refer to a range of specific mechanisms, 
influencing the execution of corporate governance (Bebchuk and Hamdai 2009). More 
broadly it is used to explain ‘the interaction between various actors pursuing common goals’ 
(Koenig-Archibugi 2006). Although theorists tend to concentrate on specific arrangements 
according to the preoccupations of their discipline, there are a number of recurring elements 
with which they are concerned. These relate primarily to four main issue areas. The foremost 
without doubt concerns responsible organisational behaviour, usually understood in terms of 
accountability and transparency. A second and almost equally significant area of concern is 
around the representation of different stakeholder interests within a given institution. Here the 
discussion is largely about issues of inclusiveness and equality, and whether all interests have 
the same economic or technical capacity to participate effectively. A third concern is centred 
upon decision-making, and the ways in which decisions are reached, and disagreements 
handled. The fourth major aspect of governance is the manner in which policies, programmes 
or standards are implemented, or put into practice. These institutional arrangements, identified 
across the fields of international relations, comparative politics and public administration, 
have a bearing on governance quality, and they are briefly reviewed here. 
Accountability has become a central aspect of the quality of governance debate, since the 
rise of new actors and new institutions beyond the territorial confines of the nation state has 
necessitated a reconfiguration of conventional democratic methods of holding institutions to 
account (Held et al. 1999). Traditional ‘vertical’ systems of national democratic 
accountability have been supplemented by ‘horizontal’ accountability in which the external 
accountability of decision-makers is to the public at large, and is linked to what appears to be 
an associated attribute, transparency, expressed in terms of public access to information and 
decision making procedures (Kerwer 2006). Transparency is effectively a precondition for 
effective accountability, since it is impossible to hold an institution to account if its regulatory 
operations are not open to public view (Scholte 2004). There is universal agreement on the 
significance of accountability and transparency in ‘traditional’ corporate governance (Garten 
1999, Hawley and Williams 2005, Detomasi 2006, Waddock 2008). Their relevance to what 
Hawley and Williams refer to as ‘financial sustainability governance’ is considerable, as they 
are currently the foremost indicators of governance quality, as in such programmes as the 
GRI.  
While accountability and transparency are acknowledged as the place to begin the 
development of stakeholder relations (UNGC and GCGF 2009) the end point is not yet clear. 
Beyond the expectation that corporations should be ‘accountable, responsible, transparent, 
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and ecologically sustainable’ (Waddock 2009) there is less clarity over what other governance 
arrangements underpin RI. Perhaps the most significant contemporary debate is what 
constitutes a ‘stakeholder’. Here there is a normative expectation in traditional corporate 
governance that the term is synonymous with ‘shareholder’. However, the more the influence 
of NGOs and other actors increases, the more encompassing the definition becomes. The 
GCGF and IFC for example identify a very wide range of actors in the constellation of ‘multi-
stakeholders’. These include local communities and citizens, private organisations, supply 
chain associates, governments, employees, investors (shareowners and lenders), customers 
and users, unions, regulatory authorities, and joint venture partners and alliances constitute a 
corporation’s stakeholder base. Whilst the primary accountability of the board of a 
corporation is to its shareowners, taking a wider view of stakeholders, it is asserted, creates 
value and wealth for a company, reduces risk, yields opportunities for innovation, and heads 
emergent problems off at the pass. This sort of collaborative model generates new 
partnerships between businesses, NGOs and governments, and creates new services and 
products (GGCF and IFC undated). However, the extent to which the participation of these 
players in contemporary corporate governance is actually realised is moot, even if interest 
representation is considered an essential component of contemporary governance (Warren 
2002). Interest representation is closely identified with the inclusion or inclusiveness of 
stakeholders, but it is also recognised as a currently unresolved problem, and a source of 
considerable institutional variation (Koenig-Archibugi 2006, Stiglitz 2003). Not including 
specific interests in global financial standards setting processes has been identified as 
resulting in legitimacy problems (Kerwer 2006). Theorists of democratic governance also 
argue that legitimacy is normatively expressed by equal participation in decision-making 
(Young 2000). Shareholders with a limited stake in decision-making cannot instigate changes 
in corporate laws if they cannot get sufficient proxies, no manner how legitimate their case 
(Bebchuk and Hamdani 2009). The US Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) has paid 
some attention this issue, and given the norm-shifting role of US financial regulation, this 
development is a space to be watched, since it is likely to have an impact on corporate 
governance standards at the global level (Hawley and Williams 2005).  
In addition to inclusiveness and equality, the capacity (or resources) of different 
stakeholders within a given governance system is also an important indicator of governance 
quality. Here business is in a more privileged position than other less well-endowed interests 
(Scholte 2004). If the argument is accepted that multi-stakeholderism in RI has been extended 
to include public interests in civil society, there may be a need for a company developing a 
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new RI programme to finance some level of external stakeholder involvement. To avoid 
conflicts of interest this should probably be limited to the provision of travel expenses – for 
remote stakeholders to attend meetings, for example. More importantly, however, there is a 
need for RI institutions to provide technical and infrastructural support to less well-endowed 
stakeholder groups if effective policy is to be created within decision-making processes 
(Mason 1999). 
In terms of decision-making itself, there is general recognition that the exercise of 
democratic rights is problematic in traditional corporate governance – even if it is accepted 
that the maxim of profit maximisation means that some controlling interests may be afforded 
more rights in this regard than others (boards of directors versus external, civic, interests for 
example). There is considerable debate concerning the mechanics of corporate decision 
making and whether minority shareholders should be allowed to exercise the right to vote. 
Boards of directors can at times prohibit this – even when there is a clear case that it could 
improve corporate governance. Here the argument against broader enfranchisement is that 
minority interests could aggregate into a majority, overriding the board. In some jurisdictions 
the inequity of current arrangements has been recognised, and shareholders have been given a 
‘say on pay’. However, even with these changes, it is still possible for controlling interests to 
exercise their powers and block resolutions that they do not support (Bebchuk and Hamdani 
2009).  
When conflict occurs within negotiations, or as a result of complaints over procedure, 
several sources identify dispute-resolution as an important administrative mechanism in 
collective action institutions (Ostrom 1990, van Vliet 1993, Meidinger 2006). The inability to 
resolve conflicts has been identified as a key indicator of governance failure (Stoker 1998). 
Traditionally, disputes have related largely to matters which impact on shareholders’ rights, 
board activities, and corporate governance although the trend for greater recognition of other 
interests is occurring here as well. Since judiciary enforcement is weak in many countries, 
legalistic mechanisms have not always proved effective, and companies have increasingly 
moved to alternative dispute resolution (ADR) mechanisms. This mediation-based approach 
has legal standing in some countries, and can help avoid litigation. Mediation is seen as 
advantageous since it seeks to promote interests over positions, and open discussion above 
secretive behaviour (Runeson and Guy 2007). 
Implementation is widely understood as the process of putting policies and programmes 
into practice and is an important aspect of any RI scheme. In the domain of environmental 
policy, effective implementation has been identified as relating to both the behavioural- and 
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problem solving abilities of an institution (Skjærseth et al. 2006). This perspective can be 
naturally extended to RI, since the very act of investing responsibly demonstrates the 
intention of shifting current investment behaviour away from unsustainable projects, and 
towards tackling environmental, social and economic problems. Here market-driven 
programmes such as carbon finance for example, with its stated intention of reducing overall 
global emissions through such initiatives as carbon offsetting, or emissions trading spring to 
mind. Given the inherently dynamic nature of environmentally related investments, such 
institutional approaches also need to incorporate a degree of flexibility to be resilient in the 
face of changing external circumstances (such as rising global temperatures). Non-resilient 
systems on the other hand can be negatively affected by such changes (Folke et al. 2005). The 
other side to effective implementation is enforcement and compliance. This can occur both 
via ‘soft’ instruments, of which RI is clearly an example, and ‘hard’ law, which inevitably 
impacts on RI via national financial regulations. However, voluntary codes of conduct are not 
generally known for their enforcement capacity. Consequently enforcement within the sector 
will continue to rely on both market forces and prescriptive regulation.  (Hawley and 
Williams 2005).  
After more than two decades of discussion about ‘new’ governance there is a well-
articulated understanding in the academic literature about the main elements of contemporary 
governance such as responsibility, interest representation, decision-making and 
implementation. But this does not mean that scholars know exactly how all these criteria fit 
together; nor have companies adopted them comprehensively. Nevertheless, there has been 
some diffusion of these notions into the RI sector. The problem therefore remains as to how 
the other arrangements alluded to here can be taken into account when determining 
institutional performance. Here the application of principles, criteria to the evaluation of an 
institution’s governance, rather than the programmes it implements, can be of value, and this 
idea is explored in more detail below.  
 
3.5 Governance and institutional legitimacy  
In short, the governance arrangements underpinning RI are still being developed, although it 
can be seen that global agencies, including UNEP FI, UNGC, GRI, IFC and GCGF are 
playing an influential role in norm building. The expectation for increased participation that 
these developments have brought about still pose some major problems for RI governance, 
both in terms of how to structure institutional responses in ways that effectively deal with the 
global problems encouraging the move towards responsible investment, but also how newly-
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enfranchised actors should be included in decision-making processes. Interaction is now 
occurring in non-spatial systems where multiple interests seek to make decisions whose 
impacts transcend boundaries so completely that it has become necessary to rethink current 
arrangements (Rosenau 2000, Arts 2006).  
Much of the quality of governance debate revolves around the question of legitimacy, and 
whence it is derived. Two theories currently dominate. Legitimacy can be ‘input oriented’, 
that is, derived from the consent of those being asked to agree to the rules, and concerning 
such procedural issues as the democratic arrangements underpinning a given system. 
Legitimacy can also be ‘output oriented’, i.e. derived from the efficiency of rules, or criteria 
for ‘good’ governance and demonstrated by substantive outcomes (Kjaer 2004). Legitimacy 
can therefore be determined both according to the principles of democracy on the one hand 
and efficiency and effectiveness on the other (Bernstein and Cashore 2004).  
However, given the nature of contemporary governance emphasised in the literature, 
quality of governance is best understood as being determined by the relationships between 
actors as they are expressed in an institution’s structure and process, and the outcomes these 
interactions generate; the more these elements are balanced the more governable the system 
(Kooiman 2000). ‘Good’ governance in this context should therefore be defined as the 
effective interaction between the structure, process and outcomes of a given institution. 
Contemporary governance is increasingly participatory in nature, with an increased role for 
multi-stakeholder dialogue, or deliberation, in content development and decision-making. 
Consequently, there have been calls for a more sociological conception of contemporary 
institutional legitimacy (Bernstein and Cashore 2004). This concept, which is to be 
understood normatively, given the extent and maturity of ‘new’ governance, is represented in 
Figure 3.1. 
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Figure 3.1: Normative model of contemporary institutional legitimacy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In a sense, this model is an argument in figurative terms. What is being argued here is that 
contrary to the two previous schools of thought, which are divided into ‘the means justify the 
ends’ (input legitimacy) and ‘the ends justify the means’ (output legitimacy), this model 
stresses that the means and the ends are equally important. They are directly related and 
consequential to each other; both contribute to legitimacy. In other words, there’s no point 
having a governance system, which is wonderfully participatory and deliberative, but 
constitutes nothing more than an endless ‘talk fest’. In this case, it is not legitimate because it 
delivers no substantive agreements and longer term change (or solution to the problem at 
hand). Conversely, there’s little point in ‘delivering results’ if participants in a given system 
are overridden, ignored, or excluded. In this case there is no collaboration and stakeholder 
participation is therefore of dubious legitimacy in terms of due process; consequently, there is 
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likely to be no longer-term change in stakeholder behaviour, and the given problem is 
unlikely to be solved, as there is no broad-based ‘buy in’.  
 
3.6 Assessing governance performance 
In this model, the legitimacy of an institution lies in the extent to which structure and process 
interact effectively, determined by the nature, role and extant of deliberations between 
stakeholders within the governance system. The system’s performance can be evaluated, and 
a rating provided. The difference between the rating that would be delivered by such a model 
and existing methods is that such a rating is based on a holistic examination (inputs, outputs, 
and outcomes) of an institution’s structures and processes, rather than individual corporate 
attributes. Once institutional legitimacy is understood in these terms, it is then necessary to 
determine exactly what institutional arrangements are being evaluated in the approach to 
rating as suggested here.  
At present, the problem of competing approaches to evaluating corporate social responsibility, 
as noted above, is also visible in the RI sector. In the case of screening for example, there is 
an evolving debate over which method is preferable: some companies use negative screens 
(no alcohol, tobacco, firearms); others screen positively (best-in-class); others simply on the 
basis of the degree to which a company engages and involves multi-stakeholders (UNEP FI 
and Mercer 2007). This can lead to competing claims over which approach is best. This is a 
somewhat pointless conflict, given the fact that such screens are often internally generated, 
and/or following specific off-the-shelf products, driven as they are by varying ideological 
assumptions or divergent institutional imperatives.  
The result is that there is considerable inconsistency in the RI sector regarding the legitimacy, 
or otherwise, of both the products being evaluated and the evaluation methods being used. A 
useful response to these problems of inconsistency is to envisage the evaluation of a 
governance system not in terms of specific attributes like transparency, but in terms of its 
structures and processes as a whole. In the following discussion, based on Cadman (2009), the 
various governance arrangements discussed above are brought together into a hierarchically 
consistent framework of principles, criteria and indicators (PC&I) of governance quality. 
A principle is a fundamental rule, which serves as a basis for determining the function of a 
complete system in respect to explicit elements. A principle can also express a certain 
perspective, or value, regarding a specific aspect of the system as it interacts with the 
governance system. Criteria function at the next level down, and can be described as 
categories of conditions or processes, which contribute to the overall principle. They are 
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intended to facilitate the assessment of principles that would otherwise be ideational and non-
measurable. Criteria are not usually capable of being measured directly either, but are 
formulated to provide a determination on the degree of compliance. They are consequently 
linked to indicators, which are hierarchically lower, and which represent quantitative or 
qualitative parameters, and do describe conditions indicative of the state of the governance 
system as they relate to the relevant criterion. The value of a hierarchically consistent PC&I is 
that they are scalable and can be applied at multiple levels, and in individual contexts 
(Lammerts van Beuren and Blom 1997). The relationship between principles, criteria and 
indicators, and how the various governance arrangements discussed above can be formulated 
for assessing institutional performance, are laid out in Table 3.1 below. 
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Table 3.1: Hierarchical framework of PC&I for the assessment of governance quality 
Principle Criterion Indicator 
Inclusiveness 
Equality 
Interest representation 
Resources 
Accountability 
‘Meaningful 
participation’ 
Organisational responsibility 
Transparency 
Democracy 
Agreement 
Decision-making 
Dispute settlement 
Behavioural change 
Problem solving 
‘Productive deliberation’ 
Implementation 
Durability 
Source: Cadman, 2009 
In this framework the previously disparate components of ‘good’ governance have been 
brought together in a model in which participation is conceived as a fundamental aspect of 
institutional structure, whilst deliberation is central to the processes and procedures utilised by 
that institution.  
‘Participation as structure’ is expressed by the principle of meaningful participation. This 
term is frequently associated with participation in much of the literature, and serves here as a 
normative, qualitative descriptor. This term first appears in the United Nations Declaration on 
the Right to Development, adopted by General Assembly resolution 41/128 of 4 December 
1986 (Gaventa 2002). The principle has two associated two criteria: interest representation, 
concerning who is involved in the governance system; and organisational responsibility, 
referring to the ethical behaviour of these interests as they interact with each other and 
external parties. Interest representation is evaluated by three indicators: inclusiveness, 
referring to participants’ levels of access; equality, concerning the weight, or balance of 
power, between participants; and the availability of resources (technical, economic or 
institutional), which ensure that participants’ interests are properly represented. The second 
criterion, organisational responsibility, is evaluated by two indicators accountability and 
transparency. Accountability has two components: the extent to which the participants are 
vertically accountable to management and other actors within the organization; and 
horizontally accountable to their clients and the public at large. Transparency refers to the 
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extent to which the activities of the institution in question are open, visible, and accessible to 
scrutiny by actors within the institution, and the wider community.  
‘Deliberation as process’ is expressed by the principle of productive deliberation (Dryzek 
and Braithwaite 2000). This principle is more than a statement about the democratic 
legitimacy of a process, as it refers both to the quality of deliberations, as they occur within 
the system, as well as the quality of the outcomes, or products, of those deliberations. The 
principle of productive deliberation is captured by two criteria: decision making and 
implementation. Decision making refers to the existence of measures to reach agreement, the 
manner in which decisions are made, and how disagreements are handled, and is evaluated by 
three indicators: democracy; agreement; and dispute settlement. Democracy concerns the 
extent to which a system can be deemed as functioning democratically and whether those 
engaged in deliberations are expressing the ‘will of the people’ (i.e., the wishes of their 
constituents), rather than a specific democratic mode. Agreement, like democracy, refers not 
so much to the merits of one method over another (e.g. voting vs. consensus), but the degree 
to which deliberation is encouraged or checked. Finally, dispute settlement focuses on 
whether the institution has procedures to settle disputes and whether these are effective. 
Implementation concerns the putting into practice of the substantive outputs generated and is 
evaluated by means of the indicators of behaviour change, problem solving and durability. 
Behaviour change is used to determine whether the implementation of agreements, or 
substantive outcomes results in changed behaviour regarding the problem that the system was 
created to address. Problem solving refers to the extent to which the system has solved the 
problem it was created to address (in this case irresponsible, or unsustainable, investment). 
Here durability is interpreted as referring to systemic resilience, as well as flexibility and 
adaptability (whilst still ensuring a degree of consistency). 
The advantage of this framework for analysing the quality of governance over single, dual- 
or multi- criteria approach is that it establishes a strong hierarchical logic between the 
elements commonly used to assess governance quality. It thus makes explicit how key 
governance concepts such as democracy, accountability and transparency are articulated with 
each other. Notably, the framework does not directly include the concept of legitimacy, a key 
criterion used by many analysts to assess governance quality. This is because the framework 
conceptualises legitimacy as the final end point of institutional performance, which is 
determined by the successful interaction between the structural and procedural components of 
the governance system, as Figure 1 has outlined above.  
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3.7 Problems with the ‘single criterion’ approach to governance quality 
A major implication of the governance quality framework advanced in this chapter is that 
determining the legitimacy of an institution on the basis of individual criteria is problematic. 
Corporate social responsibility, for example, with its emphasis on accountability and 
transparency addresses only a restricted set of governance quality indicators. If CSR is 
adopted as the sole expression of a company’s commitment to environmental, social and 
economic performance, other significant aspects of institutional behaviour can be overlooked. 
Enron made much of its commitment to corporate social responsibility, and was assiduous in 
publicly reporting on its social and environmental activities. But this ‘fig leaf’ approach to 
accountability and transparency contributed very little to the company’s overarching 
philosophy and objectives (Baker 2007). There are more contemporary examples. The 
Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), for example, seeks to promote 
transparency through public reporting on what payments oil, gas and mining companies make 
to governments, and what governments do with these revenues. This is a multi-stakeholder 
programme, and includes civil society, which participates in the design, monitoring, 
evaluation and discussion of local procedures. Although acclaimed as a ground-breaking 
initiative, only three of the 24 signatory companies have moved to full disclosure in all 
countries where they are active, and only two of the 21 participating governments had 
produced fully audited and reconciled reports (Doane and Holder 2007).  
A similar approach is to be found in the RI sector. The fact that the Royal Bank of 
Scotland was an active supporter and promoter of the Global Compact, UNEP’s Finance 
Initiative and the Equator Principles – and was also audited under the AA1000 
AccountAbility Principles Standard – did not shield prevent it from what can now be seen 
with hindsight as involvement in irresponsible investments (RBS 2008). Of course, no 
company can be insulated from the vagaries of global capital, and not even exemplary 
behaviour can protect all institutions in all contexts, but there is a real danger that focussing 
on single elements of ‘good’ behaviour, such as public disclosure, can be used as a surrogate 
for a more profound commitment to governance quality. If the actions of the Royal Bank of 
Scotland Group (RBS) are explored in more detail for example, it is possible to see the use of 
vague and equivocal language in its 2008 report; for example it ‘considered’ the Global 
Reporting Initiative and ‘sought to cover the principles of the Global Compact’ (RBS: 11). 
One of the more profound problems here is the voluntary nature of such non-state approaches 
to governance, one that is explicitly promoted by UNEP FI for instance is that the 
commitments to sustainability made by the signatories to the Initiative represent nothing more 
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than ‘aspirational voluntary declarations of intent’ (UNEP FI 2009d). When corporations and 
governments band together to form voluntary private-public initiatives to reassure the public 
of their commitment to ‘good’ governance, it is difficult to determine the legitimacy of these 
assurances when they are based on such a restricted set of assessment criteria. 
 
3.8 Conclusions 
The recent financial crisis should encourage RI stakeholders to pay greater attention to 
considerations of institutional governance when making investment-related decisions. This 
chapter has explored the changing nature of governance at the global level and its impacts on 
traditional corporate conceptions, particularly in terms of the role accorded to non-economic 
participants. In recent decades ever-increasing numbers of environmental and social interests 
have become involved in the development of a wide range of sustainable development-related 
initiatives, including investment. When it comes to analysing the quality and legitimacy of 
governance practice within these divergent institutions, it has become necessary for scholars 
to develop more cross-disciplinary approaches than before. As the world comes to grips with 
a range of global problems, and social political interactions increasingly shift to non-state 
contexts, governance standards have the potential to become an important means by which 
legitimacy can be evaluated. Such standards will make it easier for potential participants to 
determine whether they should engage in a given programme or not. It will avoid some of the 
uncertainties that interested parties currently experience over the legitimacy of a given 
institution, and whether to lend it credibility through participation. In this context, standards 
for the determination of quality of governance could act as a surrogate, substitute or 
supplement to territorially-based regulatory frameworks. In view of the inconsistency in the 
literature over what constitutes ‘good’ governance, and the claims financial institutions make 
for themselves – and entrepreneurs make on their behalf – such global standards are in fact 
essential. This goes for any sector, including the financial sector and the RI sector. 
The RI sector, based as it is on the PRI (a voluntary set of agreements) does not have any 
formal standards for accrediting RI activity. Financial analysts and investors tend to develop 
and use their own in-house screens (or other mechanisms) for determining the degree to 
which various materialities might affect their choice (or development) of a certain product. 
The justification for such an approach might be that there are so many different categories of 
investor out there (from church groups to conventional banks) that it is impossible to 
determine any kind of universal approach, and it is best left to the analysts to develop their 
own ratings. However, different entities place different emphases on ESG: just E or S or G or 
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combinations thereof. Governance is seen as being merely another criterion, rather than a 
fundamental, of RI. This is resulting in a great deal of inconsistency between what RI 
assessment/accreditation programmes might consider relevant for determining investment 
practice (accountability, or disclosure, or one, or both, or others), and the indicators by which 
these are assessed. It is worth giving some consideration to what such inconsistencies might 
mean for emerging RI markets, such as carbon finance. Playing devil’s advocate, the question 
might be asked as to how this makes RI any better than the various financial mechanisms 
used by the banks and other ventures, that have been blamed for the GFC. How, with the 
proliferation of potentially ‘toxic’ programmes in the market, can the sector avoid a collapse 
of confidence in the legitimacy of RI? In view of such possible dangers, standards for 
determining the quality of ESG across the sector will probably become essential. Such an 
assertion is based on the view that ESG is not just as a side-component of RI, but the basis for 
sustainable development in the ‘post greenhouse’ era.  
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